Somaliland and Somalia compete for US partnership over bases and minerals

Somaliland has moved to deepen its ties with Washington by offering the United States exclusive access to its mineral resources and potential military facilities, intensifying a rivalry with Somalia for American strategic favor in the Horn of Africa. Khadar Hussein Abdi, Somaliland’s minister of the presidency, said the self-governing territory is ready to grant the US privileged rights to its lithium, coltan, and other critical minerals, alongside the option of hosting American bases on its soil. He expressed confidence that Hargeisa and Washington would eventually reach an agreement, framing the proposal as part of a broader campaign for formal international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood. Somaliland, which has administered its own institutions since 1991, is recognized by Mogadishu as part of Somalia but has its own government, security forces, currency, and passports.

The latest overture follows a landmark diplomatic shift in December 2025, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel was recognizing Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, making it the first country to do so. The decision, described by Netanyahu as aligned with the spirit of the Abraham Accords, drew sharp criticism from the African Union, the European Union, and several Arab states that continue to back Somalia’s territorial integrity. Somaliland’s leadership has presented this recognition as a breakthrough in its decades-long quest for legitimacy, and has in recent weeks also floated the idea of granting Israel privileged access to its mineral wealth and even allowing an Israeli military footprint in the territory. Officials in Hargeisa argue that these offers can anchor new security and economic partnerships while leveraging Somaliland’s position opposite Yemen at the entrance to the Red Sea, where Houthi attacks have disrupted shipping and targeted Israeli-linked interests.

Somalia’s federal government has responded by trying to lock in its own security and economic relationship with Washington, in part by invoking Cold War precedents. In early 2025, a leaked draft letter from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to US President Donald Trump offered the United States “exclusive operational control” over the Berbera and Baledogle air bases, as well as the ports of Berbera and Bosaso, in a bid to “bolster American engagement in the region.” The draft, dated mid-March, reignited tensions with Somaliland because Berbera lies in territory administered by Hargeisa, even though Mogadishu still claims sovereignty over the region. Somaliland’s leadership condemned the initiative as dangerous and misleading, insisting that any foreign power seeking to work through Berbera must negotiate with Somaliland’s elected authorities, who say they alone control the port, airport, and surrounding infrastructure.

Berbera, located on the Gulf of Aden, has long been a strategic prize due to its deep-water port and proximity to vital sea lanes connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The port is operated by Dubai-based logistics group DP World under an agreement with Somaliland, adding a Gulf dimension to the competition over access and influence. Somaliland officials argue that Washington understands the realities on the ground and will ultimately choose to engage directly with Hargeisa regarding any military or logistical arrangements involving Berbera, rather than relying on commitments made by Mogadishu. Somalia, for its part, has also sought to revive a 1980s military cooperation framework that once gave US forces access to Somali facilities, portraying the effort as a way to anchor American counterterrorism operations and contain rival powers in the Red Sea corridor.

The rivalry plays out against a crowded strategic backdrop. The US already maintains its only permanent base in Africa in neighboring Djibouti, while China operates a military facility there as well, underscoring the Horn of Africa’s importance for global shipping and great-power competition. Turkey has expanded its military role in Somalia, operating its largest overseas base in Mogadishu, training thousands of Somali troops and managing both the capital’s port and airport through Turkish companies. Turkish F-16 fighter jets were recently deployed to Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, following months of construction of new hangars and supporting infrastructure, in a move described by Somali and Turkish officials as intended to protect growing energy and space-sector investments and reinforce Ankara’s influence along the Red Sea. Regional analysts see Turkey’s deeper military footprint as part of a wider contest involving Gulf states, Western powers, and now Israel, all vying for access and leverage along one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints.

Within this shifting landscape, Somaliland’s leadership has attempted to position Hargeisa as a more stable and coherent interlocutor than Mogadishu. Officials contend that Somalia’s political factions remain divided and unable to produce consensus on key security and economic questions, making it a less reliable partner for long-term arrangements involving ports, airfields, and resource concessions. They argue that closer engagement with Somaliland on security cooperation, mineral extraction, and infrastructure development would contribute more effectively to safeguarding Red Sea shipping lanes and countering militant threats spilling over from Yemen and Somalia’s own conflict zones. By courting both Washington and Jerusalem, Somaliland is betting that a combination of security value and critical minerals will eventually translate into wider diplomatic recognition, even as Mogadishu works to reassert its primacy as the sole internationally recognized authority over Somali territory.