Economic intelligence remains underused in Moroccan companies

15:16

By: Dakir Madiha

Economic intelligence remains underused in Moroccan companies

Economic intelligence remains largely underused in Moroccan companies despite its central role in competitiveness and strategic decision-making. The concept is widely known in theory, but its practical application stays limited across most small and medium-sized firms due to structural and organizational constraints.

Marouane Hatim defines economic intelligence as a set of coordinated actions used to collect, analyze, distribute and protect strategic information in order to improve competitiveness and create value. He notes that this definition remains abstract for many Moroccan business leaders. The gap does not come from a lack of vision. It comes from limited resources, weak internal organization and the absence of structured information systems in many firms.

In practice, information in Moroccan companies still circulates through informal networks and managerial intuition. Access to reliable sector data and local market studies remains limited. High costs of databases and the scarcity of domestic research limit wider adoption. As a result, economic intelligence is often concentrated in large companies with dedicated budgets and specialized teams.

Hatim argues that Moroccan firms already carry out fragments of economic intelligence without formal structure. Examples include informal competitor monitoring during tenders, tracking central bank decisions and collecting market signals through sales teams. He identifies three structural weaknesses. Companies rarely organize internal information flows. Sensitive data is not formally protected. Decision-making remains heavily dependent on the owner, especially in family-run businesses that account for an estimated 80 to 85 percent of the productive fabric. This dependence creates risks linked to succession and knowledge loss.

To expand economic intelligence in small and medium-sized enterprises, Hatim recommends low-cost and practical tools. He suggests a weekly sector press review based on free sources, a standardized field reporting sheet for sales staff and a monthly 45-minute internal meeting to share collected signals. He also calls on professional federations, regional investment centers and chambers of commerce to pool analysis efforts and produce accessible summaries. The shift required is cultural, moving from personal control of information to shared organizational systems.

He compares Morocco’s situation with Canada’s institutional model of economic intelligence, built on active chambers of commerce, regional development agencies and sector clusters. He considers the model only partially transferable. Differences include information-sharing culture, institutional relations with firms and the structure of the economic fabric. He highlights a Moroccan advantage in digital tools, which allow a lighter, decentralized and lower-cost intelligence system.

Hatim links economic intelligence to national ambitions such as attracting foreign direct investment, positioning Morocco as an African hub and preparing for the 2030 World Cup. He argues that the country is in a momentum phase rather than a defensive position. Economic intelligence, in this view, is not only a tool of protection but also of opportunity detection. It can help identify shifting African markets, track global value chain changes and detect early investment signals. He proposes a national offensive system structured around three pillars: sector-level anticipation of global shifts, territorial intelligence for African markets and event-driven intelligence focused on 2030-related opportunities.